According to the signaling view of education, education a. only helps firms sort workers into high-ability and low-ability workers b. increases human capital and the wages of workers c. can make any worker into a superstar d. reduces the wage gap between highly-educated and less-educated workers

The signaling view of education suggests that education serves primarily as a signal to employers about a worker's abilities, rather than just enhancing those abilities. This is particularly interesting because it implies that the degree one holds might matter more than the skills they learned. Essentially, a fancy diploma might just be a way of saying, "Hey, I can stick with something until the end!" In practice, this perspective can lead to some quirky job market scenarios! For instance, individuals may find themselves in roles that don't directly relate to their field of study, simply because they've proven they can complete a degree. This can result in an overqualification phenomenon where workers land jobs that don’t fully utilize their skills or education level, sometimes leading to job dissatisfaction or pressure stemming from perceived expectations.